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Asymmetrically Dominated Choice Problems, the
Isolation Hypothesis and Random Incentive Mechanisms
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1 Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America, 2 Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel, Germany,
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Abstract
This paper presents an experimental study of the random incentive mechanisms which are a standard procedure in
economic and psychological experiments. Random incentive mechanisms have several advantages but are incentivecompatible only if responses to the single tasks are independent. This is true if either the independence axiom of expected
utility theory or the isolation hypothesis of prospect theory holds. We present a simple test of this in the context of choice
under risk. In the baseline (one task) treatment we observe risk behavior in a given choice problem. We show that by
integrating a second, asymmetrically dominated choice problem in a random incentive mechanism risk behavior can be
manipulated systematically. This implies that the isolation hypothesis is violated and the random incentive mechanism does
not elicit true preferences in our example.
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behavior [18]–[21]. In contrast to these studies, in the present
experiment asymmetrically dominated alternatives are not included in the set of options in a given task but asymmetrically
dominated choice problems are included in a RIM as additional,
independent tasks. Given that isolation holds, choice behavior
under RIM in one task should not be influenced by the presence of
a different task even if preferences are menu-dependent. Asymmetrically dominated choice problems are understood as follows:
Suppose there is a choice between a safe lottery S and a risky
lottery R. Then a second choice problem, also consisting of a safe
alternative S9 and a risky one R9, risky-dominates the first problem if
R9 dominates R and S9 is dominated by S. Analogously, a third
problem, consisting of a safe alternative S0 and a risky one R0,
safely-dominates the first one if S0 dominates S and R0 is dominated
by R. Our hypothesis is that in the presence of a risky-dominating
choice problem alternative R (S) looks less (more) attractive,
leading to a higher fraction of S choices. The opposite should hold
in the presence of a safely-dominating choice problem.

Introduction
Under a random incentive mechanism (RIM) subjects usually
respond to numerous tasks (e.g. different binary choice questions,
bidding for an object in several rounds, etc.) and at the end of the
experiment one of the tasks is randomly selected and played out
for real. RIM provides incentives for truthfully responding to all
tasks while only paying one of them. This reduces expenditures for
experimental studies and excludes wealth effects from paying all
choices sequentially during the experiment as well as portfolio
effects from paying all choices at the end of the experiment. Due to
theses appealing features, RIM has been used in many experimental studies in psychology, e.g [1], [2] and economics, e.g. [3]–
[5].
However, it was pointed out by Holt [6] for binary choice
between lotteries that RIM is not necessarily incentive compatible.
If the reduction of compound lottery axiom holds, RIM only
provides incentives for truthfully reporting preferences which
satisfy the independence axiom. Since there exists abundant
evidence that independence is often violated, the argument of Holt
challenges RIM seriously. This motivated several experimental
studies aiming to test whether RIM does elicit true preferences
[7]–[16]. All these studies did not observe serious distortions
induced by the use of RIM. A convincing reason for this result is
the isolation hypothesis from prospect theory [17] which implies
that subjects evaluate each task in a RIM independently of the
other tasks.
This note presents a simple experiment which tests isolation and
incentive compatibility of RIM in the presence of asymmetrically
dominated choice problems. The literature of context-dependent
choice has shown that adding asymmetrically dominated alternatives in the set of options can systematically influence choice
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org

Methods
Two experiments were run at the University of Kiel with
altogether 581 subjects. Subjects gave written consent to
participate in the study. As there was no possibility to lose money
in the experiments, approval of an ethics committee was neither
required nor obtained. In both experiments subjects were
randomly assigned to one of five groups, referred to as Groups
1, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, and 3.2 in the sequel. For Experiment 1 the stimuli
received by the groups (in each case printed on a single sheet of
paper) are presented in Table 1.
In Group 1 subjects had just to choose between Options A and
B. Subjects were told that everybody would receive the payoff of
1
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Table 1. Design of Experiment 1.

Group 1

First Choice

Group 2

Group 3

Option A: 4 J with 100%

Option C: 3 J with 100%

Option E: 5 J with 100%

Option B:10 J with 50%

Option D:12 J with 50%

Option F: 8 J with 50%

0 J with 50%

0 J with 50%

0 J with 50%

Option A: 4 J with 100%

Option A: 4 J with 100%

Option B:10 J with 50%

Option B:10 J with 50%

0 J with 50%

0 J with 50%

Second Choice

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090742.t001

are two-sided and *** (**, *) refers to a significance-level of 1%
(5%, 10%). While 82.8% of subjects chose B in Group 1, this
fraction reduces to 51.9% and 59.3% in Groups 2.1 and 2.2
respectively. In both cases, the difference is significant. As
expected, A turns out to be more attractive in Groups 2 leading
to a significant violation of isolation and, therefore, to a failure of
isolation. In Group 3 we have expected the opposite effect as in
Group 2 but the fraction of B choices is not significantly higher
than in Group 1. This may be due to a large fraction of subjects
preferring B anyhow and hence due to a ceiling effect. There are
also in each case significant differences between the choice of R in
Groups 2 and 3. This shows that the choice behavior in a RIM
depends strongly on the other tasks involved. All four tests of the
RIM (i.e. 2.1 vs. 3.1, 2.1 vs. 3.2, 2.2 vs. 3.1, and 2.2 vs. 3.2) lead to
significantly different choice behavior. Therefore, RIM is not
incentive-compatible in our experiment.
Ordering effects between Groups 2.1 and 2.2 as well as between
Groups 3.1 and 3.2 can be observed which are all in the expected
direction, i.e. the choice behavior between A and B should be less
affected, if this choice is presented first. However, these effects are
insignificant. The relatively small ordering effects can be explained
by the fact that in the instructions to Groups 2 and 3 all
alternatives were presented prior to the response of subjects.
Table 4 reports the differences of fractions of B choices in the
single groups for Experiment 2. Here, in contrast to Experiment 1
we do not observe significant differences between Group 1 and
Groups 2 but now the differences between Group 1 and Groups 3
turn out to be significant such that isolation is again violated. Also
between Groups 2 and 3 in three out of four cases responses are
significantly different which shows that RIM is not incentive
compatible.

the chosen option in cash directly after the experiment and that
the payoff of Option B would be determined by a coin flip. In
Groups 2.1 and 3.1 there were two choice problems (presented in
the order of Table 1) and a RIM was employed, i.e. there was a
first coin flip which determined whether the first or the second
choice problem was played out for real and a second coin flip
which determined the payoff if one of the risky options (B, D, or F)
was chosen. Group 2.2 (3.2) differed from Group 2.1 (3.1) only by
the order in which the choices were presented, i.e. the choice
between Options A and B was presented first in Groups 2.2 and
3.2. In all groups the left-right positioning of options was
randomized. Design of Experiment 2 was identical to that of
Experiment 1 with the only exception that the payoff of all safe
options (i.e. Options A, C, and E) was increased by one Euro.
The aim of Group 1 is to elicit true preferences of subjects
between Options A and B as a design with one choice problem
played out for real offers perfect incentives to state true preferences
[22]. Also in Groups 2 (3) we elicit preferences between Options A
and B which could however be biased as the design here involves
additionally a risky-dominating (safely-dominating) choice problem. If the isolation hypothesis holds, the fraction of subjects
choosing A should be identical in Groups 1, 2, and 3. If isolation is
violated, the additional choice problem in Groups 2 and 3 may
influence the choice between A and B. In Group 2 Option A
dominates Option C whereas B is dominated by D. Analogous to
the evidence of asymmetrically dominated alternatives in the
context-dependent choice experiments this could make Option A
look more and Option B less attractive, leading to a higher fraction
of A choices compared to Group 1. The opposite could be
expected for Group 3 as here A is dominated by E whereas B
dominates F. Comparing the fraction of B choices in Groups 2 and
3 with those in Group 1 provides a simple and direct test of
isolation. In Groups 2 and 3 we observe choices between A and B
which are embedded in a different RIM. Therefore, comparing
the fraction of B choices in Groups 2 and 3 provides a test on the
incentive compatibility of RIM.

Table 2. Results.

Results

Group

The results of both experiments are presented in Table 2 which
states for all groups and both choices the fraction of subjects
choosing the risky lottery. First, we can see that in Groups 2.1 and
2.2 indeed by far most subjects choose the risky option D. These
subjects may be reluctant to choose B leading to a higher fraction
of observed A choices as compared to Group 1. Also in Groups 3.1
and 3.2, most subjects chose as expected the safe option E and for
those A could look less attractive.
Let us first look at Experiment 1. The differences between
choices of B in the single groups are presented in Table 3 along
with tests according to the test-statistics of Conlisk [23]. All tests
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org

1

2.1

2.2

3.1

3.2

Experiment 1
N

58

54

54

62

56

% Choice of B

82.8

51.9

59.3

80.6

78.6

88.9

96.3

12.9

3.6

% Choice of D (F)
Experiment 2
N

61

62

59

57

58

% Choice of B

31.1

29.0

33.9

52.6**

43.1

87.1

93.2

7.0

5.2

% Choice of D (F)

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090742.t002
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Table 3. Differences in the Choice of B in Experiment 1.

Group 1

Table 4. Differences in the Choice of B in Experiment 2.

Group 2.1 Group 2.2 Group 3.1 Group 3.2

Group 1

-

Group 2.1

30.9***

-

Group 2.2

23.5**

28.3

-

Group 3.1

2.2

228.7***

221.3**

-

Group 3.2

24.2

226.7***

219.3**

2.0

Group 1

-

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090742.t003

Group 2.1 Group 2.2 Group 3.1 Group 3.2

Group 1

-

Group 2.1

2.1

-

Group 2.2

22.8

24.9

-

Group 3.1

221.5***

223.6***

218.7**

-

Group 3.2

212.0*

214.1***

29.2

9.5

-

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090742.t004

significantly different. We can conclude that choice behavior in
RIM depends substantially on the other tasks involved and
asymmetrically dominated alternatives have an impact in the
hypothesized direction.
Altogether, the presented results demonstrate that a common
methodology in experimental studies may induce distortions.
Further research is needed in order to investigate how serious
these distortions are in practice.

Discussion
This note has shown with a very simple experimental design
that integrating asymmetrically dominated alternatives in a
random incentive mechanism can manipulate choice behavior
systematically. In our study isolation is violated significantly and
RIM does not elicit true preferences. We ran eight tests of isolation
(fraction of B choices in Group 1 versus the other four groups in
both experiments) and observed a significant violation in four
cases. This is rather clear-cut and not mixed evidence because
isolation cannot be used to justify use of RIM unless it holds
generally; holding 50 percent of the time clearly will not do.
Additionally, we ran eight tests of the incentive-compatibility of
RIM (fraction of B choices in Groups 2 versus Groups 3 in both
experiments) and in seven out of these eight tests responses were
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